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1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of a fissile material safeguards system in a tue1
reprocessing faci1ity is to prevent or detect any diversion of fissile
material from the plant. Of the three basic safeguards measures /-1, 2_/
namely, containment, material balance and other redundant methods, availab-
le to a control authority, the second measure plays a key role in a proper-
ly developed safeguards system. A complete containment of fissile material
may not be economically practicable in a reprocessing plant operating in-
dustrially, and an excessive use of the third measure may require undesirab-
le intrusion in the plant or impose a heavy burden of activity on the con-
trol authority. Whereas a material balance for aplant can be established
relative1y economically and without causing an excessive intrusion into
the plant oran excessive workload on the control authority.
With the help of a fissile material balance around a reprocess-
ing plant, it is possible to assess the probability of a diversion after
it has taken place. This means there is always a finite time lag between
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the time of diversion and its detection, and a diversion ca.n.nO't be
prevented directly by carrying out a material balance alone. However,
with a proper choice of strategie points in a plant a.."ld a combination of
other safeguards measures, the material balance may decrease the possi-
bility of diversion in an indirect manner and may also reduce the time
lag between a diversion and its deteetion.
2. CHOICE OF STRATEGIC POINTS
To establish a complete fissile material balanee in a reproeess-
ing plant over a given period of time, it is essential to determine the
amount of fissile material whieh has flown into the plant, the amount
whieh has come out of the plant and also the amount which has remained
inside the plant (denoted as hold"up of the pla.n.t) düring the sallle period
of time.
2.1. Input and output measurements
The input and output of fissile material can be definitely and
completely determined by measuring the fissile material content in all
the effluent streams to and from aplant. It is therefore, necessary and
also sufficient to locate the strategie points only at the effluent
streams to determine the input and output amount of fissile material.
In a reprocessing plant these strategie points are:
(a) Fuel element storage area (Pt. a; Fig. l)
(b) The input accountability vessel containing the dissolver
solution and recycle feed stream (Pts. lb, la; Fig. 1)
(c) The product output accountability station (Pts. 3, 4; Fig. 1)
(d)Waste exit points (Pt. 4; Fig. 1)
It is to be noted thatof the four points mentioned above only the points
b), c), and d) are required to establish the material balance. Tne first
point is required mainly for containment. The fissile material eontent is
not determined at this point but i t is only ensured that all the f'uel
elements received at this point also reach the dissolver tank. The other
two points 5 and 6 shmm in Fig. 1 are the socalled interna! strategie
points and are located after the active part of the proeess and before the end
purif':t.eation step. They are not r~quired for estä'blishitig the tn~terÜU
balanoe but may otter some speeifi.-e-ad:v-an"tag-es in rea.UGhg-t-i1e-4&s-~>3;:il±1:Jo'·-~-­
ties of diversion. These advantages are diseussed in ehapter 4 of this
paper. The strategie points for the waste streams are symbolieally eombined
together in point 4 of Fig. 1. In praetiee some losses also oeeur from the
inaetive area.
2.2. Hold-up measurement
The amount of fissile material which enters the plant at the be-
ginning of a reproeessing operation and becomes the plant hold-up, eannot
remain and aceumulate in the plant for an indefinite period under indu-
strial conditions. It has to appear at some later date in one of the
effluent streams. This time lag may not be very high for a campaign type
operation in whieh a certain amount of tuel is reprocessed in a batchwise
manner. The plant operator has to g1larantee areturn of at least 98 - 99%
of the fissile material fed into the plant. As the plant is normally
started without any appreeiable fissile material hold-up, it has to be
built up at the beginning of the operation before the plant can start
proeessing purified material under equilibrium conditions. At the end of
theeampaign,the plant operator has to process the fissile material
hold-up also to fulfil his guarantee. This fissile material appears then
mainly in the product stream and partly in the waste streams. In a con-
tinuously operated plant the hold-up may not appear in any of the effluent
streams for much longer periods of time than in a campaign type operation.
But it can also be measured in the effluent streams by reproeessing it and
emptYing the plant from time to time. Besides, the fissile material is
eontinuously renewed in the hold-up of such aplant and a partieular
fissile atom has to appear in one of the effluent streams after traversing
through the various proeess steps. Therefore, for the establishment of a
fissile material balance it is completely adequate to determine the input
and output flows as well as the hold-up amounts in a reproeessing plant
at the strategie points mentioned under 2.1 only and no additional points
are required.
3..' RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC POINTS
Although fissile material flows at all the effluent strategie
points have to be measured, the importanee of these points are different.
-4-
The range of uneertainties in the integrated amount of fissile material
whieh is obtained at eaeh of these points after a given amount of fuel
has been proeessed, ean be regarded as an index for assessing the relative
importanee of these points. For a given amou.'!1t of fissile material, the
range of uneertainties is main1y a function of the fraetion of fissile
material passing through a strategie point and the aeeuraeyvith which the
amount is measured. These aeeuraeies are not randomly distributed among
the strategie points but have definite range of values for a partieular
point because of the eharaeteristies of the material to be measured at
this point.
3.1. Overall ranges of aceuraeies at different strategie points
The strategie points in a reprocessing plant are sh~~ in
Fig. 1. Under normal operating conditions two fissile material streams
have to be measured at the first strategie point for determining the in-
put. These streams are first1y, the fissile material input to the dissolver
from the fuel elements (1b) and seeondly, the fissile material contained
in the reeireulated aeid stream (1a). Beeause of the different types of
operations involved in determining the amount (density or volume measure-
ment, samp1ing, determination of eoncentration) and the high aetivity of·
the solution, the attainable overall aeeuraeies of measurement for the feed
solution from the dissolver may be on1y between 1 - 2 %. The major eontri-
bution to the overall inaeeuraeies may be from the volumetrie measurement.
The aeeuraey for the aeid reeye1e stream lies somewhere around 3 %. The
plutonium and uranium in the produet streams (3, 4) are obtained in highly
purified form and the attainab1e accuraeies therefore are fairly high.
They may 1ie in the range of 0.2 - 0.25 %. The waste streams (4) eontain
very small amounts of fissile material and are high1y aetive. The overall
aeeuraeies of fissile material measurements may be in the region of
10-20 %.
3.2. Range of uneertainties for simulated reproeessing eampaigns
A number of reproeessing eampaigns were simulated with two
different plutonium throughputs and different measurement aecuraeies
to assess the range of uneertainties at the different strategie points.
The input data for the simulation are summarized in tab1e I. The low
Pu-eontent fue1s eorrespond to an advaneed light water type reaetor with
a burnup cf around 20 000 Mt>ld/t whereas, the high Pu-content fuels re-
present a typical sodium cooled fast breeder type with an averaged core-
blanket burnup of around 27 000 MVld/t. The Pu-concentraticn is that for
a mixed core-blanket management. The batch sizes for the two types corres-
pond to three batches per reactor load.
In determining the ranges of uncertainties (expressed in kgs of Pu),
four times the standard deviation a were used. This corresponds to a
confidence level of 99.9936 %, whereas all the accuracies in measure-
ments /-expressed in %_7 correspond to a relative standard deviation of
one a.
The rangeS of uncertairities for three different aecuraeies in feed
measurements for the two different Pu-tfu'oughpül:;s have beefi pres~nted in
tables 11 and 111 respeetively. The accuräeies of measurement at the rest
of the strategie points were kept constant for all eampaigns and are also
shown in table 11. Only the uneertainties in Pu-amounts have been presen-
ted,as the uneertainties in the U-235 amounts for the low eoncentrations
eonsidered here, are negligible. A summary cf all the assumptions and the
results i8 given in table IV.
The most important point to note from both the tables is the fact
that the range of uneertainties increases linearly with increasing ~naceu­
racies. The highest amount of uncertainty is contributed by the feed point
followed by the recycle acid, product and the waste point respectively.
For ranges of accuracies and throughputs considered here the relative im-
portance of the strategie points will also be in the same order.
Although 99 %of the plutonium fed into the plant passes through
the product point, the range of uncertainties is less at the product
point than at the point for recycle acid, even though only 12.5 %of the
t~tal plutonium. passes through the latter. This is because cf the lower
accuracy cf measurement at the point for recycle acid. On the other hand,
the range cf uncertainty in the waste stream is the lowest although the
inaccuraey of measurement is the highest there. The main reason is the
small amount of fissile material flowing through this point.
Another important point to note is the influence of the number of
sampIes täken. The accuracy improves with increasing number of sampIes.
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For example, extrapolating the feed point accuracy to 0.2 % (table II),
the range of uncertainties reduces to 0.25 kg of plutonium as against
0.27 kg for the product point, which also has an accuracy of 0.2 %.
Three sampIes were assumed to be taken daily for the feed stream compared
to two sampIes for the product stream. In table III, 35 sampIes were
assumed to be taken for the product stream and 15 for the feed stream.
For the same accuracy, the situation is reversed in this case.
An analysis of the results presented in tables II and III show that
maximum amount of effort and care has to be devoted to the measurement of
fissile material flow at the feed point. With increasing plutonium through-
put the requirement for high accuracy becomes all the more important. The
accuracy for the recycle acid stream should also be improved and if this
is not possible, the amount of recycled plutonium should be reduced. The
present day product point accuracies are quite adequate even for fairly
high throughputs of plutonium. No strong incentive exists for the i~prove­
ment of measurement accuracies in the waste streams.
3.3. Probability of diversion for different accuracies at the feed point
(
The probability of diversion for different accuracies at the feed
point have been given in table V. The campaign for the low Pu-content
fuels (table II) has been taken as the basis for these calculations. The
results of table V are shown graphically in Fig. 2, in which the constant
probability of diversion lines have been drawn as parameter with the amount
of plutonium diverted as the ordinate and the measurement accuracies at the
feed point as the abscissa. It is to be noted that a given probability of
diversion always corresponds to a value which is > the amount of plutonium
shown as diverted in table V end Fig. 2 /-3_/. The probability of diversion,
which is a statement made by the safeguarding authority, decreases with the
increasing inaccuracy of measurement at the feed point. Since the probabili-
ty of diversion influences partially the effectiveness of a safeguarding
system, the results of table V and Fig. 2 show that the effectiveness of the
system would decrease with increasing inaccuracies at the feed point.
4. EFFECT OF INTERNAL STRATEGIC POINTS
It was mentioned under 2.2. that no other strategie points than
those mentioned in 2.1. are necessary to establish a complete material
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balance in a reprocessing plant. Introduetion 01' additional strategie
points at (5) and (6) in Fig. 1 may however, give some advantages for
the overall safeguarding systems. These points are after the
extraction cycle (in which the uranium. and plutonium are decontaminated
to a fairly high degree and separated from each other) and before the
end purification stage. The plutonium in the form 01' Pu-nitrate is
stored in tanks bef'ore the end purification step and collection 01' samp'"
les and measurement 01' the volume 01' the solution by the controlling
authority at this point may not cause an intolerable intrusion for the
plant. The advantages 01' this strategie point are summarized below. The
same advantages would be obtained for the uranium stream also (5).
{i} Since the fissile materia~from this point onwards are
considerably less aetive, the introduetion 01' a strategie
point will devide the plant hold-up into an aetive and
an inaetive part. The fissile material hold-up between
two eonseeutive strategie points will be redueed thereby.
(ii) The material bal8U~ee can be established for the two parts
separately by considering the measurement at point (6) as
the plutonium output for the aetive part and as input for
the inaetive part 01' the plant.
(Hi) Sinee the plutonium at point (6) ean be measured with the same
high aecuraey as at the produet point {3}, and the hold-up will
be lower than the total plant hold-up, the range 01' uneertain-
ties in the amount measured will be eonsiderably lower for this
part 01' the plant than for the whole plant. As a result, the
probability for the deteetion 01' a given amount 01' diverted
material will be higher.
{iv} Normally it would be easier to divert plutonium from the in-
aetive part 01' the plant as it is present in a readily aeeessible
form. Sinee the probability 01' deteetion for a given amount 01'
diverted material from the inaetive part inereases by the in-
troduetion 01' a strategie point at this step, the risk 01' diver-
sion would inerease as weIl. The plant operator would then tend
to plan a diversion from the aetive part 01' the plant where the
risk would be less {beeause 01' the lower aeeuraey 01' the feed
point}. The uncontrolled extraetion 01' plutonium f'rom an aetive
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part of the plant is assddiated with a corisiderably larger
amount of effort than is required from the inactive part of
the plant. The introduction of the 'strategic point (6) may
therefore exert an indirect influence to prevent diversion.
The niain disadvantage pf these points may lie in the fact that recycling
of fissile materials to other parts öf the plant may be reqmred f'tom
process considerations. A detailed analysis of the process is necessary
to assess properly the virtue of these two strategie points.
5. STRATEGIC POINTS FOR A REPROCESSING PLANT nr A CLOSED FUEL CYCLE
All the considerations ca.rried. out sofar have been made for a
single reprocessing plant. The only differenee, if the plant were to be
apart of a closed fuel cycle, would be that the accuracies of measure-
ments at the feed end and the product end, for the same range of uncer=
tainties, need to be slightly less. However, the accuracies for the de=
termination of fissile material content in irradiated fuel elements from
a reactor, whieh forms the previous step for the reprocessing plant in a
closed cycle, are expected to be considerably less than the feed point
accuraeies in the reprocessing plant •.Therefore, the introduction of the
concept of a closed tuel cycle would not bring any significant advantage
for the feed end of a reprocessing plant and it would not be possible to
eliminate the strategie point at this end. The accuracies at the product
end may however, be reduced by a faetor of around 1.4, as the product can
be measured with the same accuracy at the entrance of a fabrication plant,
which forms the next step of a closed fuel cyele. It is also possible to
eliminate the measurement of the fissile material flow at either the pro-
duct end of a reprocessing plant or the feed end of a fabrication plant in
a closed ~~el cycle, as cne cf the measurement is redundant. It would
however, be preferable to eliminate i t at the fabrication plant as other-
wise, the completion of material balance in a reprocessing plant might
be delayed considerably, so that the detection of a probable diversion
would also be delayed. The control activity at the entrance of a fabrication
plant cannot however, be eliminated completely. Even if no fissile material
measurements be carried out there, the control authority has to ensure
that all the fissile material received at this plant is also processed.
6. USE OF TRACERS TO DETERMINE TBE HOtD..UP MilD TBE RATE OF CHANGE
OF' HOLD-UP IN A PLAN'!'
The hold-up of fissile material cah be detemned. only with a
tiine lag in case i t is nieasured as a throughput at one of' the strategie
points for the outgoJ.ng streams. It may however, be possible to follow
the tiine behaviour of the hold-up and may even be possible to detemne
the actual amount of hold-up with the help pf suitable isotopic tracers.
To determine the time behaviour i. e. the rate of change of hold-up
with time, a suitable isotope (either of uranium or of plutonium) may be
added to the feed solution, with a given periodicity. If the hold-up
remains constant during the operation, the same periodicity would be ob-
served and measured in the product stream. In case the hold-up does not
remain constant but also shows some periodicity, this will be superimposed
on the periodicity introduced at the feed point. The resulting periodicity
which will be characteristic of' the normal operation, can also be measured
at the product point. Any deviation from the feed periodicity (in case of
a constant hold-up) or the resulting periodicity (in case of a variable
hold-up), for a given throughput would mean that the hold-up has deviated
from the normal operation. The nature of' the deviation may throw some
light on the behaviour of hold-up inside the plant.
With a radioactive tracer with suitable half life and activity,
the actual amount of hold-up in the plant may be estimated by adding
this tracer to the feed solution and measuring its activity in the
product stream.
Data on some uranium and plutonium isotopes which may be of
interest in this connection are shown in table VI.
Further work in this field would however be necessary before the
suitability of this method can be assessed.
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TABLE 1. INPUT DATA FOR SIMULATING FUEL REPROCESSING CAMPAIGNS
Plant capacity
/-t heavy metal /d_/
Batch size /-t_/
Pu~concentration /-w %_7
Total amount of
Pu-processed /-k&-/
Pu lost in the
waste /%_/
Amount of Pu in
recycle acid /-%_/
Hold-up in the plant I-t_/
(total hea"\"'J metal)
Type of distribution for the
measuring accuracies and
losses
Low Pu
content
fuel
30
0.44
132
1
1.0
12.5
6
normal
High Pu
content
fuel
15
7.0
1050
..
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TABLE 11. RANGE OF TJNCERTAINTIES FORDIFFERENT ME..<\SUREMENT
ACCURACIES IN FEED STREAi\l1 FOR LOW PU CONTENT FUEL
Total amount of Pu proeess~d: 132 kg;
Aeeuraeies (la) at strategie points: la : 3%;
3 : 0.2 %; 4 : 10 %;
No of samples at strategib points I-per day_/:la: 3;
3 : 2, 4 : 6
Aeeuracies at Feed Point (lb)
I-la, %_1
No. of s~mp1es at feed point
1 per d 1
- -
0.5
3
1
3
2
3
Range of uneertainties
l-kg Pu; 40_1
Strategie points (Fig. 1)
Feed (lb)
Produet (3)
Acid reeye1e (la)
Waste (4)
Total uncertainties
0.63 L26 2.53
0.21 0.27 0.27
0.45 0.45 0.45
0.10 0.10 0.10
0.85 L37 2.59
TABLE 111. BANGE OF UNCERTAINTIES FOR DIFFERENT MEASUREMENT
ACCURACIES IN FEED STREAM FOR HIGH PU CONTENT FUEL
Total amount of Pu proeessed: 1050 kg,
Aceuraeies (la) at strategie points :_same as in tab1e 11;
No. of samp1es at strategie points i per day_/: 1 a: 15;
3 : 35; 4 : 30
Aeeuraeies at Feed Point (lb)
I-la; %_1
0.5 LO 2.0
Number of ~amples at feed point
1 per day_/ 15 15 15
Range of uneertainties
/ kg Pu; 40 I
- -
Strategie points (Fig. 1)
Feed (lb) 3.16 6.33 12.66
Produet (3) 0.75 0.75 0.75
Aeid reeye1e (la) 2.35 2.35 2.35
'Vlaste (4) 0·51 0.51 0.51
Total uneertainties 4.05 6.81 12.84
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TABLE IV. RANGE OF UNCERTAINTIES IN PLUTONIUM MEASURED AT
STRATEGIC POINTS IN A REPROCESSING PLANT
Low Pu-Content High Pu-Content
Fuel Fuel
Amount· of Pu 132 1050
Processed I-Kg_I
Measuring
Accuracies
I-la; %_1
,
Product 0.2 (2) 0.2(35)
Acid Recycle 3.0 (3) 3.0(15)
Waste 10.0 (6) 10.0(30)
Feed 0.5 (3) 1.0 (3) 2.0(3) 0.5(15) 1.0(15) 2.0(15)
Range of Uncer-
tainties
Ikg Pu 7
- -
Feed 0.63 1.26 2.53 3.16 6.33 12.68
- -Acid Recycle 0.45 0.35
Product 0.27 0.75
~ Same Same ...,.Same Same
Waste 0.10 0.51
-
-
-
Total 0.85 1.37 2.59 4.05 6.81 12.84
( ) Number of SampIes per day
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TABLE V. PROBABILITIES OF DIVERSION FOR DIFFERENT MEASURING
ACCURACIES AT THE FEED POINT
Pu-processed, accuracies, no. of samp1es: same as 1n
tab1e 11; .Amount diverted =2 kgs of Pu
Accuracy L-1a; %_1 0.5
at the feed point _
Range of uncertainty I 4a ; kfLl 0.85
1.0
1.37
2.0
2.59
Probability of diversion
Minimum amounts (or greater) from
the diverted Pu, which can be de-
c1ared as diverted with the corres-
ponding probability of diversion
99.9936,;
95
90
80
70
1.57
1.83
1.86
1.91
1.94
1.31
1.72
1.78
1.86
1.91
0.70
1.41
1.58
1.73
1.83
TABLE VI. DATA ON URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM ISOTOPES vmICH MAY BE
CONSIDERED FOR TRACER USE
Half life Typical
activity
Method of production
I. Uranium 232Th(p,3n)~Opaß ___~OU
ß
U-230 21 d a;5.88 MeV 232Th(d,4n)~Opa ~OU
230Th(d,2n)~30paß ~OU
Can only be produced in a
cyclotron
U-232 72 a a;5.32 MeV 23~ n,y 232p ß 232ua~ a~
5.26 MeV 236Pu a(loo %l 232u
U-237 6.73 d y;0.207 MeV 24~ a(lO-3%) 237uu· )00
Ir. Plutonium
Pu-236 2.85 a a;5.77 MeV 237Np(n,2n) ~6Np ß :2S§pu
can be produced in a
reactor
Pu-246 11 d y; 1 MeV Production method not
yet known
Fuel storage
I II Dissolver and II accountability tank I
I I
I I
I I
Process steps (activel i End purificationI (less activel
I
I
I
I
I
IProduct
I
I
I
I
I
I
.....
'1'Plutonium
Uranium
wastewaste
Uranium
and
Plutonium
"----....v /
(0
0-- strateg ic points
Fig. 1 FissilE~ material flow and location of strategie poihts
in a reprocessing plant
2.0
Kg Pu
diverted
=k
I- I I I i ~ Actual amount diverted
1.5
1.0
0.5
70%
80
90
95
Constant lines of
probability of diversion
for ! k
99.9936 II-'
-t
t
o
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
% Standard deviation of measurement
at the feed point
Fig. 2 AmolUnts of plutonium divertedas a function of feed point
measurement accuracy with probability of diversion (0/0)
as J)arameter.
